Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic method enabling two parties to establish a private encryption key. The range of communication of groundbased QKD is limited to an order of 100km, due to in-fibre attenuations and atmospheric losses, and the development of quantum repeaters remains technologically challenging. While trusted-node links make communication over large distances possible, satellite-QKD is required for communication over global distances. By using satellites equipped with high-quality optical links, satellite-QKD can achieve ultra-long-distance quantum communication in the 1000-km range. The significant potential of satellite-QKD for the creation of global quantum networks thus makes it a particularly interesting field of research. In this analysis, we begin with an overview of the technical parameters of performing satellite-QKD, including infrastructure and protocols. We continue with a high-level summary of advancements in satellite-QKD by analysing past, present and proposed satellite-QKD missions and initiatives around the world. We conclude by discussing the technical challenges currently faced in satellite-QKD, which can be tackled through future research in this area.
I. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a scheme enabling two parties to derive a private and symmetric encryption key. QKD has the potential to significantly advance information security and encryption processes for mankind. The development of quantum computers represents an increasing threat to conventional public key distribution, driving research into new forms of "quantum-safe" encryption techniques [1] [2] . QKD is a promising alternative to public key cryptography, providing unconditional security that cannot be obtained by classical cryptographic means as it is founded on the principles of quantum mechanics [3] . QKD is fundamentally based on the fact that quantum information is coded into the degrees of freedom (e.g. polarization states) of individual photons, which prevents successful attempts to measure and clone a quantum bit (in this case a photon). This is due to the fact that it is impossible to clone a quantum state without irreversibly altering its state (also known as the no-cloning theorem) [4] , causing it to lose its information. Hence, attempts by third parties to eavesdrop will necessarily lead to detectable errors, making QKD highly secure and resistant to interference.
The general concept behind satellite-QKD is as follows. A trusted satellite conducts QKD with ground stations to establish independent secret keys with each station. To create a common key to be used by a pair of ground stations (for example stations A and B), the satellite broadcasts the bit-wise parity of each individual key, K A ⊕ K B . Since K A and K B are independent strings known only to each station, their bit-wise parity does not reveal any useful information to eavesdroppers. Each station can obtain the other's key: For station A to obtain station B's key, it would determine the bit-wise parity of its own key with the broadcast (K A ⊕ (K A ⊕ K B ) = K B ). Similarly, station B can obtain station A's key through the operation K B ⊕ (K A ⊕ K B ) = K A . Fig. 1 : Illustration of the most common satellite-QKD scheme: the flying trusted-node. In step (a), the satellite establishes a shared secret key KA with station A by running a QKD protocol, which requires both classical and quantum communication. This step is repeated in (b) to establish a shared secret key KB, this time with station B located further away. At the end of these steps, the satellite hold both keys, while each station knows only their own. Finally, in step (c), the satellite publicly announces the parity of both keys KA ⊕ KB. This allows station B to determine key KA, which can then be used to encrypt private communication to A and vice versa [101] .
II. Technical Parameters of Satellite-QKD
There are several technical parameters that characterise satellite communication links in satellite-QKD, which are expounded below.
a. Orbit Altitude
There are three main classes of satellite orbital altitudes: Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) (sometimes referred to as High Earth Orbit) [18] . LEO is situated from 180 to 2000 km in altitude, MEO is situated from 2,000 to 35,786 km in altitude, and GEO has an altitude of precisely 35,786 km. For past and current satellite-QKD applications, LEO is the most common option (see Section III.), however future projects might seek altitudes in the MEO or GEO range [19] .
Due to the proximity of LEO satellites to the surface, losses due to beam diffraction are significantly reduced. However, there is a tradeoff in the high speed of the satellite relative to the Earth, compromising pointing accuracy during signal transmission and limited time period during which QKD can be performed. The converse is true for satellites of higher altitudes: While the satellite is moving more slowly than in LEO (in the case of MEO) or at rest relative to the ground (in the case of GEO) hence enabling QKD to be conducted continuously, much higher losses are experienced when performing QKD at significantly higher altitudes as free space losses increase quadratically with distance.
Polar LEO will pass ground stations at the poles with every orbit, whereas equatorial LEO do so on the equator [18] . Other orbital inclinations will result in less regular ground station passes, and the time of day of flyovers will vary unless the orbit is sun-synchronous. Satellites in GEO are located above the equator and closer to the horizon approaching the poles, disappearing below the horizon at 81° latitude. Hence, the optical link traverses a much larger amount of atmosphere and will suffer additional losses. To provide polar regions with near-constant satellite coverage, such locations might adopt less conventional orbit choices, such as the Molniya highly elliptical orbits [20] . Fig. 2 : Illustration of different platforms for performing satellite-QKD. Scenarios (1) and (2) depict a downlink and an uplink respectively, while in scenario (3) a downlink is simulated by using a retro-reflector on board the satellite. In (4) pairs of entangled photons are being transmitted to Earth so that two ground stations can share entangled states. Finally, scenario (5) illustrates how inter-satellite links can allow more complex satellite-QKD networks [101] .
b. Link Configuration
Quantum communication links with a satellite can be classified either as uplinks or downlinks. This results in several possible configurations for performing QKD with satellites depending on the types of links that are used [21] [22] [23] .
In a downlink configuration (Scenario 1), the satellite sends signals to the ground. Downlinks are usually recommended for operational QKD, and the only type of link that has been demonstrated [24] . The primary source of optical losses is beam diffraction, which increases with the square of link length, and downlinks always have lower losses for any ground-satellite segment. This arises because atmospheric properties such as turbulence cause the optical beam to wander, which translates into a less accurate ground transmitter compared to a space-based transmitter.
In an uplink configuration (Scenario 2), the ground station sends signals to a receiver in space. The main advantage of using an uplink is that it is not necessary to locate a quantum light source in space, but only to place a receiver on board the satellites [25] . There is a lower photon detection rate on board the satellite and hence a significantly smaller amount of data to be stored and exchanged via a classical, authenticated but non-secure communication channel. It also makes attacks that target receivers significantly more difficult [26] . However, a disadvantage of using uplinks is a greater uplink loss of ~10dB due to atmospheric turbulence, which is most significant in the first 20 km above the Earth's surface. These extra losses are significant when weighed against the advantages of locating quantum light sources on the ground. To overcome this challenge, signal-to-noise ratio filters can be used to discard data at high noise levels, reducing the number of photons required for error correction and privacy amplification [27] .
Retro-reflectors on the satellite (Scenario 3) can also be used to create downlinks by modulating signals sent from the ground as they bounce off back to a receiver also on the ground [28] . The challenge here is to develop fast modulating retro-reflectors, and to develop countermeasures that prevent an eavesdropper from sampling the state of the retro-reflector while QKD is being carried out.
In a double downlink configuration (Scenario 4), a source of entangled photon pairs located in the satellite transmits photon pairs to the ground, with each photon in a pair being transmitted to each ground station in communication [29] . This configuration allows the realization of entanglement-based QKD directly between the ground stations, without using the satellite as a trusted node.
Inter-satellite links (Scenario 5) allow for communication between two satellites in the same orbit (intra-orbit links between satellites in LEO, MEO or GEO) or in different orbits (inter-orbit link) [30] . A combination of inter-layer and intralayer links, called constellations of satellites (see Section IV.) can enable more complex satellite-QKD architectures by allowing each system to collaborate with other systems. This increases the quality of satellite services, decreases the unavailability of services and integrates different services in a single system [31] .
c. DV-QKD or CV-QKD
QKD protocols can be divided into two categories: discrete-variable quantum key distribution (DV-QKD) or continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). In DV-QKD, information is encoded onto discrete degrees of freedom of optical signals. In CV-QKD, information is encoded in the quadratures of randomly selected coherent states and measured using either homodyne or heterodyne detection [32] [33] . While most satellite QKD projects have chosen to implement discretevariable schemes, significant research has been dedicated to both approaches leading to increasing key generation rates and improved compatibility with current communications infrastructure. However, both approaches are limited in that physical communication channels introduce transmission losses that increase exponentially with distance, greatly limiting the secure key rates that can be achieved over long ranges. There is also a need to reduce the reliance on classical communication between the two parties when establishing the final key [33] [34] .
d. Photon Sources
For DV-QKD, there are two main photon sources: weak coherent pulses (WCP) or polarization-entangled photon-pairs. Short attenuated pulses from laser diodes provide controlled weak coherent pulses needed to provide photon states for DV-QKD to enhance the security of these systems. However, each pulse has a finite probability of containing more than a single photon [35] [36] . Decoy-states have hence been created to reduce the likelihood of photon-number splitting attacks and thus detect eavesdropping. One party randomly chooses between two intensities of coherent state signals, which is revealed publicly to the other party after quantum communication, improving the tolerance to losses compared to the typical prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol that does not employ decoy-states. This increases the transmission distance and rate of key generation [37] . To address the need for active polarization manipulation, the usage of four laser diodes in a single transmitter [35] exploits the high degree of polarization of the diodes, allowing each diode to be identified with a unique polarization state. Using a single laser diode coupled to four waveguides, the side-channel accessible by potential eavesdroppers was closed. Each waveguide was capable of a fixed amount of polarization rotation and the signals were then recombined to result in a singlemode output with four possible polarization states.
Entanglement-based QKD schemes require the generation of photons using polarization entangled photon-pair sources. These sources are based on bulk-crystal, collinear, spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC), either periodically-poled potassium titanyl phospate (PPKTP) or single-domain crystals such as beta barium oxide (BBO). SPDC is a non-linear optical process where a photon spontaneously splits into two other photons of lower energies [38] . In particular, Type II spontaneous parametric down-conversion produces photon pairs that emerge on two cones where the vertically polarized photon is on the upper cone and the horizontally polarized photon is on the lower cone [39] . A free-space link is then used to distribute one photon from the entangled pair to Alice, while the other is transmitted to Bob [39] .
d. QKD Protocols
Several protocols exist to implement QKD between two parties, which can be subdivided into prepare-and-measure (decoy-state BB84) or entanglement-based protocols.
d(i). Prepare-and-measure protocol: Decoy-state BB84
Alice encodes each classical bit into the polarization state of an individual photon before transmitting it to Bob. Alice prepares the photon state by randomly choosing between the Z basis (horizontal, |H>, or vertical, |V>) and X basis (±45º i.e. ! √! |H>±|V>), and assigning the states in each basis the values 0 or 1. After choosing the basis, Alice, using a true active random number generator, randomly selects one of the two states and sends it to Bob, who performs a set of measurements on the incoming signals to retrieve the classical data encoded in their states. Bob, using a passive random choice generator (e.g. beamsplitters), randomly selects one of the two bases and performs a measurement, recording the result as classical bits. This repeats for many signals, after which Alice and Bob announce the basis they have chosen for each measurement in the measurement set on a classical communication channel. They keep the measurements that they obtained using the same basis, and discard the measurements that they obtained using different bases. From the preserved signals, a random subset is selected to determine the relative error. In the situation of a sufficiently low error rate (<11%), error-correcting codes and privacy amplification are applied to obtain the final shared secret key [40] [41] [42] [43] . [44] d(ii). Entanglement-based protocols A maximally entangled photon pair, usually in the polarization degree of freedom, is split such that one photon is transmitted to Alice, while the other is transmitted to Bob. The entangled states are perfectly correlated such that if Alice and Bob both measure their photons with the same basis, they will always get the same answer with 100% probability. Both parties make independent decisions to measure the photons in either the Z or X basis. Since eavesdropping inevitably affects the entanglement between the two photons in an entangled pair, it detectably reduces the degree of violation of Bell's inequality.
In the BBM92 protocol, parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification occur in the same manner as in the BB84 protocol. The main advantage of the BBM92 protocol is that it removes the need for Alice to make an active random choice when encoding states into the photons, and the measurement devices for Alice and Bob are identical [45] . Fig. 4 : Complete BBM92 Protocol. Alice and Bob each receive one photon from a stream of entangled photon pairs, they randomly pick a basis to measure each photon in, get a measurement result, convert their result to a classical bit, sift their results down to only those where they measured in the same basis, use 10% of their measurements to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER), and generate a final secure key from the rest of their measurement results [46] .
Alternatively, the E91 protocol [47] , through the Bell test, will determine whether the photon-pair correlations between Alice and Bob violate the Bell inequality, confirming the quantum nature of the link and hence its inherent security. After receiving each photon from an entangled pair, Alice and Bob measure the polarization state of every photon in a randomly chosen basis for each photon and note its arrival time. Using a noiseless, authenticated but non-secure public communication channel, Alice and Bob will compare the photon arrival times and the basis in which each photon was measured, preserving the measurements that were conducted using the same basis as the measurement set. By conducting the Bell test on this measurement set, should this correspond to the value expected from Bell's inequality, no local realism was introduced to the system and thus there were no eavesdroppers [48] . This protocol is resistant to eavesdropping as information is only obtained when Alice or Bob perform measurements and key sifting. Eavesdroppers also cannot inject their own data, as doing so would necessarily lead to detection when the Bell's inequality value is too low [49] . After both Alice and Bob obtain the sifted key, similar error correction and privacy amplification processes will be performed to obtain a quantum secured secret key [50] .
The E91 measurement scheme is less efficient in its use of photon pairs as the Bell inequality test requires more polarization settings to be monitored. However, entanglement-based protocols have shown to be more tolerant to loss than prepareand-measure protocols due to the intrinsic timing correlation between photon-pairs generated in the SPDC process [51] . A typical setup is shown below, using active polarization rotators (PR), polarizing beam-splitters (PBS) and avalanche photodiodes (APD) [49] . [102] f. Optical Links
f(i). Transmitters & Receivers
Optical links use optical telescopes at the photon source transmitter and at the receiver to beam the photons between satellite and ground station. There are two main types of telescopes: refractive (or transmissive) and reflective [52] . Refractive telescopes use lenses, while reflective telescopes use concave parabolic mirrors. In general, reflective mirrors can be made larger and more durable than lenses. Because only one side of the mirror is used to focus the light, the other side can be placed against a surface for support, enabling a mirror to be much larger relative to a lens. In fact, the largest optical telescope in the world at the Keck Observatory in Hawaii is a reflecting telescope [53] . The larger the collection device, the more light can be directed to the eyepiece, and the brighter the objects appear [54] .
However, while the large size of the primary mirror is advantageous for a reflector, this same feature can quickly emphasize the optical aberrations of the telescope. To minimize polarization effects at large angles of incidence, a two-mirror assembly can be used as a tangentially directed one-wave linear retarder. The primary mirror of reflective telescopes acts as a tangentially directed half-wave linear retarder and almost completely depolarizes the linearly polarized component of the light. The secondary mirror, often placed within the path of the beam to block part of the primary mirror, introduces an additional half-wave of linear retardance. Hence, each mirror depolarizes alone but together the two-mirror assembly preserves the polarization state [55] .
Comparing space and ground-based telescopes, ground-based telescopes are much larger and consequently can capture more light. Practically speaking, they are less costly, easier to maintain and upgrade, have a much lower risk of being damaged. However, atmospheric distortion is a major issue, and Earth's atmosphere absorbs a lot of the infrared and ultraviolet light that passes through it. While space-based telescopes are smaller, more expensive and difficult to maintain, they can detect frequencies and wavelengths across the entire electromagnetic spectrum [56].
To establish the optical link, a coarse level of mechanical pointing between the satellite and ground station is achieved via satellite orbit determination data (including radar tracking, GPS and star tracker measurements). Two orthogonal axes of rotation are required to track an object across the sky. By mounting the telescope on a twoaxis gimbal, one of three gimbal configurations can be used to achieve coarse level pointing for larger spacecraft: altitude over azimuth (Alt-Az), altitude over altitude (Alt-Alt), equatorial, or a combination of the three [57] . For nanosatellites, the entire satellite is usually reoriented. Optical beacons on the ground and satellite can be used for fine-pointing, which is further enhanced by optical beam-steering systems that account for atmospheric turbulence.
f(ii). Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
Quantum bit error rate (QBER) is the percentage of the sifted raw key that does not match between Alice and Bob. QBER is generally a direct measure for the secrecy of Alice and Bob's strings since any eavesdropping strategy would perturb the correlations between them [58] . Once QBER exceeds the threshold of 11% QKD protocols based on BB84 will be aborted. The links are where the largest losses from noise and background photons from stray light occur and thus have the biggest impact on the QBER.
Stray light can be minimized through extensive optical blacking measures, however even after extensive filtering [59] , it is advised that DV-QKD is conducted at night until better solutions are found [60] [61] . It is possible to achieve this by performing DV-QKD at other wavelengths with alternative detectors [62] if suitable light sources can be found. On the other hand, CV-QKD can be conducted during the day as the optical systems used have a sufficiently small spectral bandwidth that allows much of the background to be filtered [63] .
f(iii). Pointing error
To establish an optical link, there are three stages of pointing, each with increasing accuracy. In the first stage, to achieve a broad level of mechanical pointing between the satellite and the ground, the satellite's orbit must be determined using radar tracking, GPS or star tracker measurements, and this data is exchanged through radio frequency links. In the second stage, a more specific level of mechanical pointing is achieved using laser beacons both on the ground and the satellite. In the third and final stage, the finest level of pointing can be achieved through optical beam-steering systems that serve to correct for atmospheric turbulence.
As mentioned in Section IIb., transmitter pointing accuracy is less significant in uplink than downlink configurations due to atmospheric turbulence. A 2 µrad rms error in the pointing of a 20 cm downlink transmitter would introduce 4 dB of loss compared with <1 dB for a 20cm uplink transmitter. Jitter and imperfections in the tracking systems should be minimized so their contributions to beam broadening are much less than those caused by diffraction and atmospheric turbulence. The receiver system need only point to an accuracy within its field of view, e.g., 50 µrad [64] .
f(iv). Wavelength of signal photons
There are 2 major wavelength regimes for a quantum channel, depending on the level of expected background photons: 800nm (near the peak quantum efficiency of detectors) and 1500nm (telecom wavelength, traditionally used in optical fibre for its minimum transmission losses). Many optical link systems are limited by the availability of suitable laser sources, specifically in the availability of laser wavelengths. For optical links using SPDC sources, the limiting factor is not photon generation, but the ability of the single photon detectors to distinguish between the photons arriving with small timing separations. Thus to reduce time jitter, the avalanche volume of the photodiode and hence detection efficiency is compromised [65] . Wavelength conversion efficiency is also another constraint as that of SPDC is low; the highest conversion efficiency obtained is 4 × 10 −6 [66] . Wavelength determination in terms of channel considerations is based on wavelength-dependent losses such as atmospheric absorption, diffraction losses and detection efficiency.
III. Advances in Satellite-QKD & Summary of completed and proposed missions
Below is a timeline and summary of completed and proposed satellite-QKD missions, organised by general areas of advancement in satellite-QKD. Firstly, research can be conducted to investigate further reductions in satellite size. With microsatellites (wet mass from 10 to 100 kg) and nanosatellites (wet mass from 1 to 10 kg), further advancements can be made to create a highly accurate optical link with <5 mrad pointing error. There is also a need to create sources compatible with launch and space environments. The above advancements have been achieved with minisatellites (e.g. Micius-type satellites) but not with microsatellites or nanosatellites (e.g. Qubesat). This will not only increase the accuracy and precision of the satellites, but also improve cost-efficiency when the capabilities of microsatellites and nanosatellites are advanced. Reducing satellite size without compromising accuracy hence reduces the cost of a single satellite, and increases the possibility of launching many satellites, enabling the improvement of the spatiotemporal coverage of satellite constellations.
Next, extensions to higher orbits beyond LEO can be investigated. While satellite-QKD missions have been conducted in MEO and GEO ranges (see Section III. Advancement 5), LEO is still the common choice for most applications. LEO is advantageous in its proximity to the surface, thereby reducing beam diffraction losses. Satellites in MEO and GEO are not only at higher altitudes and greater distances from the ground, they must be shrouded to prevent the reflection of sunlight to the ground station. Using brighter transmitters and improving link performance can reduce signal losses, but the performance of MEO and GEO satellites under these conditions will still be less than that of LEO. While LEO is advantageous in its reducing beam diffraction losses, the high speed of satellites in LEO relative to the Earth compromises pointing accuracy during signal transmission and restricts the time period during which QKD can be performed to a small window. Satellites in MEO and GEO, while suffering higher losses, move much more slowly (MEO) or are at rest relative to the ground (GEO), enabling QKD to be conducted continuously. It is necessary to move to higher altitudes as entanglement-QKD implemented using a double-downlink configuration from MEO/GEO can cover very large distances, which greatly facilitates the progression towards building global quantum networks. Concurrent efforts to reduce signal losses in satellites at higher orbits will enable us to reap the benefits of accurate signal transmission and continuous QKD.
The superconducting nanowire single photon detector (SNSPD) is a novel technology that has great potential to advance satellite-QKD missions and quantum technologies involving single-photon detection and advanced photon counting applications. SNSPDs comprise solid-state and optic aspects enabling high-rate (1.3 GBit s-1) quantum key distribution for long-range quantum communication (>1200 km) as well as space communication (239,000 miles). SNSPDs perform excellently in four single-photon relevant characteristics for UV to mid-IR wavelength ranges: high detection efficiency, low false-signal rate, low uncertainty in photon time arrival and fast reset time, though they cannot be optimized simultaneously. They often outperform the best available semiconductor based single-photon detectors [95] . This makes them attractive for several applications in space technologies, nearly commercial quantum systems and quantum optics [96] . However, SNSPDs are currently limited by the availability of cooling technologies, and all past experimental demonstrations have had ground-based applications [97] . This limits their application to satellite-QKD missions using downlink configurations where photon detectors are located at one the ground stations. Further development in SNSPDs allowing them to operate in space can allow them to be incorporated in a greater variety of satellite-QKD missions, specifically those involving uplink configurations.
Future research can also look into the consolidation experimental evidence of different link types facilitating comparative analysis. There have been several missions investigating the feasibility of uplink transmission (see Section III. Advancement 8). Consolidation of experimental evidence of different link types will allow us to directly compare the accuracy of optical links with various configurations.
The creation of constellations of QKD satellites can bring us closer to largescale or even global quantum networks that enable the sharing of symmetric encryption keys between any two points on Earth. A constellation model is described which enables QKD-derived encryption keys to be established between any twoground stations with low latency [98] . To provide global real-time quantum communication connectivity, a feasible solution is the building of a satellite constellation (SC), composed of multiple quantum satellites operating in LEO, and high-earth-orbits (HEO), including GEO satellites [99] . Investigations into regional and eventual global networks can be made, as well as considering the use of intersatellite QKD links for the transfer of keys between LEO trusted-note QKD satellites, GEO relay satellites and ground stations.
Additionally, comparing DV-QKD and CV-QKD protocols is a potential area for further research. Historically, most missions, including those discussed in Section III, make use of discrete-variable schemes such as photon polarization, where information is encoded onto discrete degrees of freedom of optical signals. Further investigations can be made into CV-QKD, which involves encoding information in the quadratures of randomly selected coherent states (such as position or momentum). Comparisons of the performance of the two classes of protocols can be made using metrics such as relative secret key rates, transmission distances, communication overheads and computing resource requirements of error correction codes.
Finally, while daytime QKD has been experimentally proven to be feasible from space, further investigations into daytime QKD from the ground can be made. A significant challenge of implementing free-space QKD systems in daylight is the impact of scattered background noise photons from sunlight. This hence requires elaborate elimination in spectral, temporal, and spatial domains to decrease the QBER and guarantee the system's security [100] . While space-based daylight QKD has been relatively successful, different combinations of filtering techniques can be investigated to increase the accuracy of ground-based daytime QKD.
In conclusion, significant progress has been made in satellite-QKD in recent years. While there are still a number of technological challenges to overcome through further research, many advances have been made thus far, bringing us closer to robust, accurate and quantum-safe encryption methods, and potentially a global quantum network in the near future.
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